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Reviews/Response
Levinas, Adorno, and the Ethics of the
Material Other
Eric Nelson. SUNY Press, 2020. pp. 480.

Emilia Angelova,* Curtis Hutt † and Leah
Kalmanson‡ with response from Eric Nelson §
The Relation of the Ethics of the Material Other
to the Rights of the Stranger
Emilia Angelova
My response introduces several main arguments from Eric S. Nelson’s Levinas, Adorno,
and the Ethics of the Material Other (2020) by paying special attention to his term of the
stranger, or the third party, and how it does not lie outside of the dialogical relation between
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I and you. At the end I raise a question about a theoretical discourse of political reality
today which benefits from this positioning of the relation to the third: aspirational universal
rights, the nation-state, and the stranger.
Nelson’s most recent work is provocative and novel, arguing for a connection
between Levinas and Adorno that is seldom made. Adorno affirms “non-identity thinking”
(2020: 44, 86), distinguishes it from Hegel’s theory of synthesis as sublation, and sets it up
as the third term—not to be negated by the complicity between the twin logics of a
constitutive idealism of individualist subjectivity and the domination of nature. Levinas
affirms the asymmetry of the ethical relation to the Other, distinguishes it from the
absorption of the Other to Being in Heidegger, and sets that up as a third term—evading
subsumption to the twin logics between the ego of impersonal, anonymous individual being
and the ontology of being and the thought of enframing both social totality and nature.
Nelson shows that rather than determinate negations, both these third terms, instead ought
to be read through Kierkegaard’s teleological suspension, as reversals within the system,
general equivalence of representation and instrumental rationality (181). All told, this
promotes a materialist and a constructivist ethics, primarily aimed at justifying discourses
oriented to decolonizing the marginalized subject, extending to the nonhuman (79). The
book offers a critical re-evaluation of modernity, amidst the best of its kind.
The argument posits the relation to the third party as common to both thinkers—
Levinas’s word for the Other and “all the others” (2020: 121, 125–28), and Adorno’s word
for the prophecy of redemption of “damaged life” (58, 82) and “natural history” (50, 86).
In the actions of appropriation and co-appropriation, as processes of the mutually
addressable humanization of the “human,” this relation elaborates exposure to the
“senselessness” of suffering (81).
Nelson pays equal attention to both these figures, but it suffices to introduce here
through Levinas this relation to the third, a mode of delivering ethical meaning, tied to the
constitutive materiality of the “face” of the Other. Ethics is not transcendentally
presupposed, prescriptive, and autonomy-oriented; rather, it is indicative of a more radical
sociality we belong to.
The ethical relation sets itself up within the system and code of language but is
irreducible to it. Levinas recalls materiality and need, in the relationality of acts
emphasizing the “food, drink, shelter,” and “tenderness” that I offer “to” the other. (2020:
82, 97). Materiality has no representation in the system of language; it is a diacritical form,
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subjecting the I anterior to the ego’s will of self-mastery and self-control over my speech.
The idea of ethics as responsibility to and for the Other is the paradox of my subjectivity,
where the will is not an attribute that I possess. The paradox of my subjectivity is temporal
since constitutionally it is “after the fact” of the encounter that the relation of self to oneself
occurs. Yet the recurrence of the self-relation is normative, because articulating the
subjectivity of self is a possibility only in the account of realizing the priority of suspending
violence against the “stranger” and the “child”—to use two of Levinas’s images (200).
To sum this up. Through their third terms, both Adorno and Levinas appeal to
something other than bourgeois codes of morality as higher than ethics, namely, a
possibility available within a general economy and a political economy, too, of the
exchange of goods and pleasure. Both appeal to alterity, as opposed to the ideological
identity of presentism, isolated individuals. Nelson employs, in this theory of extended
thinking and intelligibility, the term “interruption” (Hegel, Derrida) to understand both
thinkers as allied through a common interest in an indirect materialism, affinitive with
Derrida’s Specters of Marx.
In more detail, here are some key points of the argument. First, we see the oftenneglected claim about the face of the Other revived—that the face is the materiality of the
Other. This approach takes not a religious but a “rhetorical” language as centre in Levinas.
Choosing materiality through the face, as the center around which to unify Adorno and
Levinas, is novel—both are thinkers of “other-constituted” (2020: 47, 117), inter-material
life and the “evasion” of oppression.
Second, Nelson, who was trained in German idealism, skillfully shows the two
share a common philosophical inheritance vis-à-vis the tradition, which they receive in
anti-doxastic and anti-authoritarian ways. Both receive Hegel through the early Marx’s
materialism, the messianic account of time and history, and the theory of alienation of
labour. More importantly still, both treat language as filter and the empty symbolic ground
of reality, from which emerge all of the individual’s personal and political agendas.
To substantiate, Nelson recalls how Hegel engages the legacy of the French
Revolution (“freedom toward the object,” 2020: 50, 57, 77, 86; cf. Hegel, 1991, paragraph
10). Hegel claims that Culture, the Enlightenment’s battle with Faith, does not exhaust the
concept (58). Rather, for Hegel, metaphysics as a system resorts to ideas such as justice
and time, which apply to empirical beings through the symbols of language, tying the
ground of the relation to the Absolute, and to a quasi-transcendental principle unifying the
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subject—over these symbols, neither social institutions nor the individuals in them in a
given epoch hold sway. In Hegel approached in this manner there exists no way of
overcoming the schism of substance inhering in itself as subject and between the general
address of the Other and the singularity of the addressee. For a moment, I will make a
remark about Hegel—before returning to Nelson.
To expand on this narrative a bit. I seek to emphasize the power of the actuality
of the schism of Reason in Hegel, an asymmetry of obligation to the other in embodied
concretely situated ways of being. Recall Kant who presupposes that “Reason is all reality”
(Hegel, 1977: M343), which made notorious Hegel’s view of it. Hegel is right that Kant
recovers the uncanny—at the cusp of Culture and the Enlightenment as its most historicophilosophical event. Namely, by way of overcompensation for the loss it suffered (French
Revolution, Absolute Freedom and The Terror, in both Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
and the Philosophy of Right), a solipsistic, anguished Kantian Reason as unitary subject
thinks itself supreme. And yet, as Hegel shows, it is not the case that Reason reigns
supreme. Rather, the objective movement of Hegelian negativity finds the free subject as
emerging in the continuous movement—from “comedy inherent the Greek democracy,”
through the advent of revealed religion into the logical totality traced in the French
Revolution. In Hegel, the subject precisely does not strive toward an Other in order to
reduce it to the same. Precisely the opposite.
That is, as Hegel writes:
“But that an accident and such, detached from what circumscribes it,
what is bound and is actually only in this context with others, should
attain an existence of its own and the separate freedom—this is the
tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy (Energie) of thought,
of the pure ‘I.’” (1977: M19)
The boldness of phenomenological articulation here stems from a negativity that
is not posited in a subject anguished by an inaccessible sociality or transcendence.
Negativity is the “mediation” that reformulates the static terms of pure abstraction
as a process, dissolving and binding them within a mobile law of thought.
Returning to Nelson’s work. Hegel is not taken up as a Statism—the State does
not have to be repressive. By affinity with Hegel, the unifying role of thirdness is not as
synthesis—this indebts both Levinas and Adorno to a messianic account of time, tied to
the materiality of the face, the address of the other (2020: 255–56). Treating consciousness
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and its engagement with not simply its inner/outer relation to the object, but as enlarged in
its non-relational relation with exteriority, works transversally across disciplines. This
yields the “intermaterialism” and the expansive materialism of the weak powers of selfovercoming—regulative concepts and boundaries are dissolved.
Nelson brilliantly contrasts this Hegel—as a philosopher of the socially-situated
and embodied political modernity, the actualization of the concept as a self-revising
process of rationality becoming, taking responsibility for Being-becoming, being-foritself—to Kant, who acclaimed Enlightenment as a “perfectionism” (2020: 245) of the
conditions of possibility, given and delimited by the concepts of pure reason itself.
Assessing this contrast from Kant to Hegel pays off exceedingly well for the
entirety of this project. (2020: 43, 73, 77) The severity of the self-discipline of reason as
set in the interiority of a self-enclosed subjectivity, over and against an unchanging being
and a thing in itself, leads Kant to value individual autonomy and conscience over
heteronomy, and dualism between theoretical and practical reason, where norms, values
and idealization are internally set up to disavow facts. The schism in Kant lies with the
counterfactual method of producing propositional validity into true judgements, built into
the system of reason as debasing “facts” of their value, normativity and embodiment in
definition (89).
Nelson is an uncanny reader for the ways he inhabits diverse schools and thinkers,
not limited to the West. The legacy of Levinas in contemporary philosophy has been
productively engaged through Derrida’s deconstruction (2020: 195). On the other hand,
Adorno’s legacy has been resisted in Habermas and Honneth’s third generation of the
Frankfurt school. For Nelson, failure to detect both a positivity and critique (e.g., negativity
in the non-identity thinking of nature) in Adorno is akin to the failure to detect the same
things in deconstruction, for example in Habermas’s The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity.
When Nelson structurally decodes the causes of this failure to engage
productively Adorno, and by extension Levinas, what becomes apparent is the inability, a
crystallization of bad memory, pain, guilt, a hasty foreclosure plaguing contemporary
political language, Habermas and Honneth’s models of democracy, “ethics of discourse,”
and “freedom’s right,” respectively (2020: 61). In the argument against foreclosure of the
symbols of modern institutions and politically structured wholes, the reader will find
Adorno’s ethics of non-identity thinking and material others superior.
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Nelson substantiates his argument by singling out Adorno’s perhaps most
“revolutionary” (2020: 59) volumes of Minima Moralia (239) and Aesthetic Theory.
Adorno does not relent in defending the semiotic practices of “music” (68); discourses
through his “natural history,” “mimesis,” (61) and “art” (70) defend a more “expansive
materialism.” (59–63) For Nelson, key to this critique of language “is the nonidentity
between language and the contents and objects it seeks to signify.” (50) Instead of inventing
new deontological or deliberative rationality discourse ethics, or even care ethics, we are
rather to look behind the tropes of semantic or legalist positivism or originalism, around
which the so-called countries of the First World build current ethics of symmetry and
reciprocity. “Ethics of the material other,” (94) as Nelson coins the phrase, is felicitous,
and in both Adorno and Levinas, the underpinning notion is that of the primacy of the
“indirect materialism” and non-phenomenological encounter of the other, where the
encounter, far from being the end, is that with which giving an account of subjectivity, as
being for the other, begins.
Nelson’s overall critique is directed toward the “pathologies of freedom” (2020:
289, 324) as nested into power-autonomy relations of epistemological knowledge of
subject and object relations, where normativity rules warrant validity claims of symmetry
and reciprocity that represent one power for and to another power—symbolic status is
granted to those who can purchase it and excludes those who cannot. The question therefore
becomes how to disrupt dominant ideologies of symmetry and to reorient from out of the
ethics of the primacy of the asymmetry of the other person. Capitalist value systems of
maximization of profit relegate nature to secondary and derivative status. In today’s
political moment of various related crises, such as race, class, gender, colonialism, and the
capitalist crisis-tendency (60, 211), exposure to acute vulnerability is far from invisible.
To address the crisis-tendency, Nelson begins by affirming the methodological
priority of “nature”/ “the materiality of the face of the other.” Before we change the world,
we ought to change our practices of episteme, and concomitantly re-evaluate the
importance of disrupting dominant practices of subordination and cycles of “interhuman
subordination.”
At this juncture, I want to introduce an author’s view, Kristóf Oltvai’s position of
5 October 2021, which appeared in Phenomenological Reviews. The author takes issue
with whether liberalism necessarily forgets its enabling truths—e.g., asymmetrical rights
of the Other, or it forgets only contingently. The author argues that Nelson opts for the
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latter throughout his book, but on the face of it, the book is an argument in favour of the
former, therefore Nelson confronts Habermas and Honneth as neoliberals. Neoliberalism,
then, rejects the early Adorno’s materialism of non-identity thinking, rejecting as well
Levinas’s politics of the third. But the author argues, assuming Habermas and Honneth’s
neoliberalism and the nation-state has very good reasons for rejecting Adorno and Levinas,
for indeed only the former framework allows that “unrestricted solidarity” is a possibility.
How does the objector proceed? The author makes a point that a conflation
between capitalism and liberalism causes Nelson to be at odds with his own position. I do
not think that Nelson conflates the two. However, the opportunity for Nelson to address
this cluster of assumptions that the objector raises is too good to miss.
The objector writes:
“Ultimately, then, Nelson’s embrace of “unrestricted solidarities” (2020:
2) may contradict some of his sources’ terms.” “I can have an
unrestricted sense of responsibility for every possible Other, or a
solidarity with the actual others I encounter in my embeddedness in my
particular context, but unless ‘the face of the Other’ is but a cipher for a
universal ontological determination (which Levinas would surely reject),
I cannot have both.”
For the objector, Levinas aligns with Arendt: “Arendt certainly lauds such welcome, but
her basic argument is Burkean. Universal human rights are an aspirational norm, but they
are meaningless outside of a concrete political community; the nation-state’s particularism
is thus the vehicle that realizes the universal.” And Arendt would agree with Levinas that
“justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those close
and far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest”
(Levinas 1998: 159). But, the objector emphasizes, she would stress that “said ‘society’
must be bounded” if we wish to “retain a lived and practical meaning for ‘passing by’ the
neighbor.”
On my view, the above cited objection does not provide the point at which Nelson
and the author of the review might actually disagree, if indeed the two disagree at all. I
would like to invite Nelson to discuss this controversy.
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Nelson's Defense of Asymmetrical Ethics:
On Religion and Human Rights
Curtis Hutt
Eric Nelson's Levinas, Adorno and the Ethics of the Material Other (SUNY 2020) is a
dense text that deserves more than a single close reading. Compelling arguments and
insights are found from beginning to end on a very wide range of topics related to the work
of Levinas and Adorno. I am going to focus less in this short response on Nelson’s
assessments of and comparisons between Levinas and Adorno, or how the two thinkers
read other philosophers and social theorists. Instead, I want to hone in on Nelson's central,
innovative defense of asymmetrical ethics and how it might impact the ways that we think
about both the study of religion and human rights.
Nelson champions an asymmetrical ethics not based on the inherent identity,
sameness, or equality of human beings but upon our exposure to the “prophetic” manifested
in the demands of material others. Asymmetrical ethics differs from established liberal
egalitarian ethics not just in terms of its focus on inequalities but in terms of its scope.
Asymmetrical ethics do not simply concern the interactions between similar humans,
rational animals with souls that are capable of acting autonomously. Rather, it purports to
open wide a door to ethical encounters with disparate material subjects, others unlike
ourselves, who—to use the language of Levinas—impose ethical demands and obligations
upon us. A primary, introductory example of this is Nelson’s work found in part one of the
book After Nature. Many people working in human rights studies today understand that
our well-being as human beings depends upon our ability to forge new interactions with
the natural world around us—severe environmental crises impact human rights. We
become more and more aware of important intersectionalities between human rights and
environmental ethics. It is not easy to formulate ethical priorities related to these, however,
when you approach the specific topics at hand with a view of the world where the
“material” or “nature” is, by definition, of an entirely different kind than “spirit/soul/mind”
or human culture. Critically, Nelson’s asymmetrical ethics takes a step beyond naturalizing
and “materializes” human rights. He completely dismisses old familiar dualisms that have
not only removed humans in theory from the natural world but put them in a domineering
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position over it. At once, Nelson promotes a critical natural history and ethics of our human
interactions with an un-souled material world—other human beings included. The biggest
question that I will raise in this response, is will this specific kind of strategy work in the
world that we find ourselves in today. Why not do the opposite and following indigenous
traditions around the world, move to ensoul different parts of nature—extending
protections to rivers and mountains as we in the United States have already done for
businesses?
Obviously, in the face of the cries of other people, it is clear there are all kinds of
differences between humans that make them relatively unequal and unknown to one
another. Some are biological. Others are the consequence of entrenched cultural and sociopolitical hierarchies. Sub-personhood is ascribed in multiple ways. It proliferates normally
with little difficulty as habit and reflex. We continually find ourselves in lopsided
relationships with other human partners, whether these are children or parents, students or
teachers, patients or doctors. Many are de-humanized by market forces in addition to
natural and other human guided catastrophes. In what sense do we need to reconcile
ourselves with others not present? Whether these are across the world from us or time.
Asymmetrical relations are also apparent with ancestors and descendants. Can the past or
future suffering of such others impose moral obligations upon us as well? I’m not certain
that these more distant kin qualify as “material others” though they were and will be more
than mere narrative constructions. Certainly, asymmetrical relationships in many cases are
the result of brute power relations. Not only are we blind to the suffering of unequal others
that we never even consider because their lives are obscured to us, but such blindness is
often acted out knowingly and, yes, intentionally. Damaged life, in spite of the call of the
prophetic material other, is mostly hidden life. I have been convinced of this in my work
as a historian with a keen interest in subaltern pasts. I have only become more and more
aware of the differences between what people think they know about cherished pasts and
what actually happened. The past, especially that of subaltern groups, imposes from the
outside an ethical obligation on us as historians too. As opposed to simply passing on
received authorized traditions, historians optimally rewrite and compose new historical
narratives based upon new information about the past. Regularly, religious and political
discourses “disguise” asymmetrical relations to secure dominance. This has an impact upon
what we end up learning about religions in the past. Interestingly, Nelson’s portrayal of
unequal power relations—alongside his Levinasian appeal to the prophetic—provides
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scholars interested in religion and human rights some explanation of my central query
concerning the complicated relationship between the two. Why is it that some religious
conduct is complicit in the most disturbing human rights abuses, while at the same time
other behavior can be a motivating source for lessening suffering in this world? The answer
would be, that these two tracks derive from very different sources. I’m not so certain. In
addition to trying to escape from the traps of old familiar dualisms, I fear that the only way
forward here requires some meaningful incorporation of the prophetic which we must
assume does not emerge from context-less vacuums.
If I didn’t know Eric Nelson’s work beforehand, I might have been able to
characterize myself as a “stunned critic.” His deep readings of so many theorists span a
couple of centuries and continents. I would even add that his work is successfully
comparativist even if comparison based upon some underlying identity is theoretically
untenable—for example, between Jewish and Asian thinkers. To what extent do we share
a lifeworld, replete with not only “insufficient” (Levinas) and “imperfect/damaged”
(Adorno) conditions but perspectives? Nelson is less pragmatic than myself; as he knows,
I also prefer Husserl over Levinas on alterity (Hutt 2009). Understanding empathy as a
result of some kind of “rational” simulation, even if pre-conscious, almost inevitably
entails some sort of imperial ego-centric move. The tactic that I use when pursuing my
craft is to try to identify this, “reflexively” to use the language of Pierre Bourdieu or via
Husserl’s epoché or rückfrage, and to try to take everything that we can into account in our
moral calculations. I have always had a problem with Levinas’ discussion of “Otherness.”
I don’t think that what is extremely “Other” is even cognizable. While I have to say that I
agree with Husserl and folks like Donald Davidson on this front, I think that Nelson
following Levinas has provided us with a strong call for developing new tools for
incorporating the demands of material others that we are in asymmetrical relation to within
our ethical reckonings. I agree with Nelson that we need to make room for revelations from
the outside. We need to create and modify political tools to not only to do this but to then
establish new equities.
Following Dewey, I do not see “ideal ends” designed to expand basic rights such
as are found in the Universal Declaration or the assertion that we all have souls to be the
problem in toto. Such formulations are tools to get us to new places. Problems invariably
arise when these “ideal ends” become deified, naturalized, and unquestioned. This was
Dewey’s problem with the human rights discourse. The Universal Declaration, for
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example, he argued isn’t really universal—it is neither a law of heaven nor nature. Rather,
it is an extremely useful political tool developed at a specific time with wide ranging
applicability (Dewey 1973: 148). When needed, it should be tweaked and even modified.
This is especially the case when radically changed situations require us to come to new
understandings about the world we live in or when adapting basic principles to local
situations. Levinas’ claim that we have an infinite responsibility for the “Other” and the
Adorno-like turn made by Nelson to the “material other,” in my view, are something akin
to Dewey’s ideal ends. Levinas’ moral perfectionism and Adorno’s assertion that the
horrors experienced by tortured others are beyond our grasp can help guide us to a better
place – even if the rhetorical trappings make less than perfect sense. Like Gayatri Spivak
(2000: 13) who challenges us to consider whether the subaltern can ever speak, I think that
enabling what Nelson and Levinas describe as the prophetic revealment of the “Other” is—
as in all cultural translation—at the same time “necessary but impossible.” We should
continue to probe and listen, finding novel ways to coax and make room for the revealings.
The “cosmopolitan” turn suggested by Nelson in this and earlier work rightfully re-focuses
us away from universalized abstractions and towards the local. I think this has implications
for those of us engaged in both religious and human rights studies. Any move forward is
going to require a lot of new language learning and translation. There is so much diversity
just outside our physical and virtual doors, even though we express this using the tools we
have at hand. In addition to asking us to consider what we don’t know and to investigate
and listen, Nelson also asks that we step back and consider how we arrived in the particular
situations that we occupy— in what Husserl described as a method of critical, clarifying
self-reflection (Selbstbesinnung). We need to minimally check what we bring with us to
our interactions with unequal neighbors. The impositions of totalizing schemas and
declarations must be recognized as such. I still think these are useful especially when
flexible and adaptable. Once again, they should not be designated except in extreme need
sacrosanct, beyond question and re-evaluation. This said, I’m not certain that we are
operating at the moment in a political environment where very much needed progressive,
radical overhauls of religious studies or human rights agendas are viable. It is especially
important that we hold on to what has been gained through the use of the widely accepted
ideal ends in service until now, and to proceed forward step by step.
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On Nelson and East Asian Philosophies
Leah Kalmanson
While reading Eric Nelson’s Levinas, Adorno, and the Ethics of the Material Other, I recall
thinking that every sentence is a potential thesis statement. In other words, in one rich
passage after another, any given statement in the book could easily generate an essay’s
worth of commentary and discussion. Undoubtedly, I will barely have time to scratch the
surface of Eric’s achievements in his book via this brief engagement.
Given my own areas of research, as a reader I was attentive to the various
appearances of East Asian philosophies throughout the text—these are woven in
seamlessly and meaningfully. This is not “comparative philosophy” as I and others
sometimes practice it, but it is simply the range of argumentation possible when a scholar
is, like Nelson, astonishingly well-read and able to work across an incredible diversity of
primary source languages.
I was especially interested to see the prominent role given to the Pure Land
tradition of Buddhism, whose concept of “other-power” (他力) grounds Nelson’s own
reading of goodness at several key moments. In the Pure Land tradition, “other-power”
refers to the power of the Buddha to facilitate our enlightenment or liberation even when,
or especially when, our own efforts are inadequate to the task. Other-power appears in
Nelson’s book, for example, in a discussion of Iris Murdoch, where goodness is invoked
as that which “confronts the limiting prioritization of self-interest, the will, and power in
moments of love and unselfing” (251). This dynamic of “unselfing” is key not only to the
ethics of the material other that Nelson discusses throughout but also to the politics of openended solidarity that he urges us toward in the last third of the book.
For another example, other-power is linked to what Nelson describes as the
“unique noncalculative temporality” of prophecy, which strikes from beyond: it “exceeds,
escapes and resists both the naturalistic objectivity of beings and the subjective interiority
of the individual self” (188). This links Nelson’s use of other-power to the Kamakuraperiod innovator Shinran (1173–1263), founder of the largest Pure Land sect in Japan
today. In Shinran’s formulation, good acts are in fact impossible, thanks to the calculating
(hakarai 計らい) mental process of the self who sees itself as the doer of deeds, the reaper
of benefits, the target of blame—in any case, the one to whom credit is due. In other words,
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for Shinran, the ego immediately tarnishes its deeds by “doing” them in the first place, such
that any self-directed action is already misguided.
But, once, even for Shinran, in the distant past a monk did attain the superhuman
feat of liberation via self-power (自力) practices such as meditation. This monk eventually
became the Buddha Amitābha, or Amida in the Japanese, who famously has opened up the
purified realm where he resides to any who call on his name. Amida is able to do this
because his own efforts have earned him an incalculable store of karmic merit. Although
we mere mortals could never “earn” our way into a rebirth in the Pure Land, the
compassionate Amida freely donates enough merit from his limitless store to allow us
entry.
Key to Shinran’s work here is a common account of Buddhist time in which the
dharma is predicted to arise, spread, and eventually decline. In our lifetime, the era of selfpower is over: we (along with Shinran) live in the so-called third age of decline. The extent
to which we behave efficaciously in the world at all is thanks to the power of Amida’s
compassion working through us. As such, Amida’s free distribution of merit from his vast
storehouse destabilizes the logic of karmic production and exchange and makes immediate
interhuman compassion and goodness possible (for more on this, see Ueda and Hirota,
1989: 143).
This story of Amida may sound quite fantastic. But it was precisely the fantastic
elements that I contemplated as I traced the references to other-power throughout Nelson’s
book. I was reminded of a comment by Melissa Anne-Marie Curley in her 2017 Pure
Land/Real World: Modern Buddhism, Japanese Leftists, and the Utopian Imagination. As
she discusses, early 20th-century political thinkers in Japan invoked the Pure Land as an
image and possible instantiation of a coming socialist utopia: “These instantiated Pure
Lands are neither strictly transcendent nor strictly immanent. I will suggest that they are
best understood as ‘supernatural’” (23). In other words, Amida is not a “transcendent”
being in the same sense that we think of the monotheistic God as necessary, independent,
and self-caused. Rather, Amida was once just a person who nonetheless gained
supernormal powers through intensive practice. As Curley indicates with her choice of
words, the transcendent/immanent paradigm is ill-equipped to handle Buddhist modes of
thought regarding this dynamic. Hence, she selects the term “supernatural” as a marker, in
the English, that might help us think past transcendence and immanence to reimagine
Amida’s relation to the world and to us.
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I had her word choice on my mind at those moments in Nelson’s book where he
discusses other-power in relation to Levinas’s vision of transcendence and alterity. I asked
myself: what if we take the dynamics of other-power in Curley’s direction and read
Levinasian alterity as “supernatural”? This opened up an entirely different dimension of
Nelson’s book as I read it, even while I realized that such a reading parts ways with Levinas
himself (perhaps irreconcilably, as I will discuss later).
Let me begin here with one of Levinas’s short essays “Sociality and Money,”
which aligns well with Nelson’s ethics of the material other. In it, for Levinas, money itself
becomes the unlikely link between the ethical and the political. He resists the easy move,
which would be to align economic exchange with the order of the political and thus reject
any economizing of ethics. Instead, he says, money itself is rooted in the same foundational
sociality that marks the openness of the self and the welcoming of the other. From this
angle, the third party appears not as an intrusion on the face-to-face relation but as a sign
of my own failure to manage the ethical burden: “Are the elevation and sanctity of love for
the neighbour not comprised in this lack of concern for the third, which, in an anonymous
totality, can have been the victim of that very one I answer for and that I approach in . . .
mercy and charity?” (2001: 206). In other words, the other with whom I am so singlemindedly concerned can turn around and abuse someone else. Here politics is presented
not simply as a necessary compromise but as an appropriate reflection of the underlying
moral asymmetry:
Between the unique ones, a comparison, a judgement is needed. Justice
is needed in the very name of their dignity as unique and incomparable.
But to compare the incomparable is, undoubtedly, to approach people by
returning to the totality of men in the economic order, in which their acts
are measured in the homogeneity immanent to money, without being
absorbed or simply added up in this totality. (2001: 206)
In this, ethics is not an escape from politics but rather is bound to the political by the bonds
of sociality that express themselves concretely as money—the money that makes possible
the charity that transforms the real world.
This is not simple materialism. The circulation of money is subversive when it
resists economic theory, when it allows charity to run rampant, when it becomes the
flagrant expression of compassion. This, indeed, gets us close to something like the radical
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compassion of Amida, whose flagrant and free donations of merit destabilize the seemingly
ironclad logic of karmic exchange.
Let us note here that the case of Amida is not an outlier in the Buddhist context—
the merit economies of the Buddhist world are inherently destabilized along these lines.
For example, the contemplative practices of Buddhist monastics are believed to generate
great karmic merit; and, in turn, monetary donations to the monasteries or nunneries on the
part of lay-practitioners are also said to generate karmic merit. In this monastic-lay circuit
of exchange, laypeople give of their money and receive karmic merit in return, and even
that merit is ritually given away—it is dedicated for the benefit of all sentient beings via a
common recitation performed at the time of donation. But, yet again, the charitableness of
that ritual divestment of merit is itself a good deed that produces even more merit. In this
process of rampant merit production, monasteries and nunneries also accrue very concrete
material wealth, and with that accrued wealth, they provide certain social services—e.g.,
running food pantries, providing schooling for children, offering pastoral care and spiritual
guidance—in addition to the many important rituals and ceremonies monks and nuns are
trained to manage (for more, see Kalmanson 2019).
In a very direct sense, these material realities are intimately tied to spiritual
liberation and the force of compassion as a moral value in Buddhism. Jamie Hubbard has
commented:
It should not surprise us, perhaps, that a this-worldly focus on material
giving and its equally worldly reward formed such an important part of
the practices of the laity, for, although Buddhism is primarily a
renunciant movement, philosophically it denies a transcendent absolute
and affirms the interdependently originated world. (2001: 159)
In the denial of a “transcendent absolute” that grounds the world to account for the way
things are and ought to be, we see a hint of what Levinas has elsewhere called “faith without
theodicy,” where there is no other outlet, as it were, for the fruits of spiritual goodness,
other than the mouth of the stranger who needs the bread (1988: 162).
At times like this in Levinas’s work, I do begin to see evidence of the superhuman:
he calls us beyond what we would normally count as human, toward the messianic
expectation of an unrealistic future where ethics is never compromised by politics, where
each person has the strength to be moral along the lines of Levinas’s uncompromising
asymmetry—which is to say, where each person has the strength to care for every single

104 Angelova, Hutt, Kalmanson, Nelson
other as the Other, without compromise. And of course, in line with Levinas’s generally
inordinate ethical vision, we are waiting on no messiahs other than ourselves: “the Messiah
is just the man who suffers, who has taken on the suffering of others. Who finally takes on
the suffering of others, if not the being who says ‘Me’ [Moi]?” (1990: 89). For anyone
familiar with Buddhism, this sounds less like a messiah and more like the bodhisattvas,
who commit themselves to the superhuman feat of alleviating the suffering of each and
every living being; and who, through the momentum of their spiritual liberation, gain
enhanced powers to do just that.
In the eighth chapter, Nelson comments: “Levinas praises atheism as
disenchantment while at the same time rejecting atheism as the absence of transcendence”
(216). Again, the odd line that Curley tries to walk with her use of “supernatural” as a
moment of intervention in the transcendent/immanent paradigm opens up intriguing
possibilities here. I am fully aware that I part ways with Levinas when I say that I would
like to leave “transcendence” to God and consider the alterity of the other as “supernatural”
instead. But my suspicion is that perhaps I do not part ways with Nelson, at least based on
how he positions “other-power” in his ethics of the material other.
For example, there are several points where Nelson presses Levinas on the use of
“transcendence” in the ethics of alterity. Of course, in one sense, a philosophical reworking
of transcendence is Levinas’s foundational move: i.e., he relocates the transcendence
usually reserved for God and finds it instead in the flesh-and-blood face of the other person.
And yet, as Nelson investigates here, the materiality of the other person calls for something
more than just the paradox of thinking “transcendence-in-immanence.” Ultimately, such a
paradox invites us toward mystical contemplation or perhaps phenomenological theorizing.
I think that this is precisely the trajectory Nelson wants to resist through his call for renewed
emphasis on material existence, material bodies, and hungry mouths. Like Levinas (and
like Nelson, too, I think), I am suspicious of some of the calls for the so-called reenchantment of the world, if this enchantment diverts our attention from the realities of
material suffering. And yet, I still seek a marker in language that indicates an engagement
with material life and material reality that speaks precisely to the impossibility of totalizing
or thematizing the natural.
The interesting thing about a supposedly supernatural occurrence—and this is a
point that Curley stresses in her book—is that it signals something that just might happen.
If we were going to pursue this discussion more fully within an Asian philosophical
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context, I might say that the better word here would be “hypernatural.” In other words, we
are not signaling what is beyond or outside the natural but rather opening ourselves toward
the astonishing possibilities for transformation in the world we occupy right now.
Hence, I have come to think of the hypernaturalness of materiality as marking the
site where we enact real change. And reading Nelson alongside Curley and my own perhaps
irreconcilable divergence from Levinas has helped me re-envision the scope and radicality
of that change. Reclaiming a sense of the supernatural may not accomplish the
metaphysical task of re-enchantment so much as it accomplishes the political task of
challenging Levinas’s own biases that divide the “idolators” from the “religious” precisely
along lines that privilege transcendence as a philosophical position. Ultimately, Nelson’s
picture of a more radical religiosity in his book has invited me to reconsider the
“supernatural” as a term of philosophical engagement, and I remain deeply interested to
hear more on whether this maps at all onto directions he might also consider.
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Author Response: The Ethics of the Material
Other and the Right of the Other
Eric S. Nelson
1. INTRODUCTION
I am deeply thankful for the thoughtful engagement of Emilia Angelova, Curtis Hutt, and
Leah Kalmanson with this work concerning ethics and material others (Nelson 2020). I
will begin by briefly situating the book’s context and then respond to these significant
questions concerning the nation-state and the stranger, religion and human rights, and the
other, other-power, and other-constitution.
Lévinas, Adorno, and the Ethics of the Material Other has had a long journey into
publication. An earlier shorter version was accepted with need for revisions by Duquesne
University Press that then shortly thereafter halted the publication of new works. This was
a great loss to Emmanual Lévinas studies. It meant that the manuscript went through a
second review process and the final published version was influenced by four reviewers’
suggestions and concerns leading in divergent directions and making some facets of the
book overly abstract and complex.
One misconception that I want to note is that the purpose of this book is not a
communistic Lévinasianism that rejects liberalism in every sense. It concerns the dialectic
of liberalism in which its economic and libertarian forms undermine and restrain its
political forms for the sake of a more radical democratic socialist and rights-oriented
politics conceived through the other rather than the self. This book accordingly offers a
critique of what can be described as classical possessive or economic liberalism and
neoliberalism (i.e., liberalism in the sense of capitalism) while defending a social form of
the aspirations of political liberalism (i.e., democratic and individual rights) through critical
models of asymmetry, non-identity, and otherness that are unfolded in works of Lévinas
and Theodor W. Adorno that can orient social criticism and deliberative communication. 1
This work is accordingly not a comparative commentary of their works, but an
analysis of contemporary questions informed by their thought. Asymmetry and nonidentity can reorient political thought and praxis in significant ways, including an
intercultural approach to the public sphere, democracy, and human rights that could
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formulate models to contest oppressive forms of universality (as in colonial and neoliberal
forms of cosmopolitanism) and particularity (as in ethnocentrism, nationalism, or varieties
of multiculturalism that seek to exempt repressive authoritarian regimes from criticism
through cultural essentialism).
This project encompasses two key hermeneutical strategies: one historical, and
the other more systematic and diagnostic. First, its historical task was to explicate the
radical French republican, Marxist, and prophetic Jewish context of Lévinas’s philosophy.
I take the ethical to be already intrinsically political, or the ethical to be a response to the
political, which is situationally first as Lévinas strongly states in the preface to Totality and
Infinity (Lévinas 1994: 21-30) or as indicated in Leah Kalmanson’ s discussion of
Lévinas’s essay on money. It also traced the ethical moment in Adorno’s thought that is
often suspicious of and resists ethical and normative ways of speaking as ideological.
Although they are frequently interpreted as incompatible modes of philosophizing, there
are astonishing intersections between Adorno’s ideology-critique of the ethical and
Lévinas’s ethical confrontations with the political.
Secondly, drawing on Lévinas, Adorno, and other sources, its diagnostic and
therapeutic task was to reimagine Lévinas’s philosophy for the sake of a critical social
theory of the present. The historical reconstruction of the critical and prophetic potential of
Lévinas and Adorno could not be separated from our own current interpretive situation and
ecological and social plight. Consequently, critical models (that are somewhere between
the factual historical situation and normative and utopian demands that can operate as
ideology and critique) from their writings were deployed to question the devastation of the
environment and climate crisis, the social-political pathologies of religion and the potential
of its prophetic vocation in response to suffering and injustice, and the corrosion of the
public sphere and democratic practices and institutions. These three problematics might
appear to be separate topics; yet they express the entanglement of the domination of nature
with interhuman domination that must be addressed as a whole in its material,
intersubjective, and ideological reproduction of contemporary societies.
2. THE NATION-STATE, THE STRANGER, AND THE PARADOX OF RIGHTS
Emilia Angelova addresses this problematic of universality and particularity, the nationstate and the stranger in her rich and complex essay, drawing on the political philosophy
of Hegel, Arendt, and a recently published review that critiqued my critique of liberalism.
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First, to begin with the last point concerning liberalism, part of the issue at stake
is the differing concepts of liberalism. For most of modernity, liberalism did not signify
the priority of democratic rights and political participation, but the right to person, property,
and commercial activity that formed the legal and political basis of capitalist economic
activity. Liberalism means possessive individualism and the priority of negative liberty and
the reign of the unregulated free market; republicanism, from Rousseau through Marx to
Lévinas, signifies the priority of the general will and what was once called in gendered
language the “rights of man” to liberty, equality, and fraternity. Most European and global
political and economic theory maintain this usage, whether Enrique Dussel, Jürgen
Habermas, or the libertarian Friedrich Hayek who long refused to abandon this previously
standard meaning of liberalism. In chapter one of Hayek’s 1960 book The Constitution of
Liberty, liberalism is defined as the priority of individual personal liberty to which rights
to equality, solidarity, and democratic political participation must always be secondary.
This sense of liberalism is at play in Lévinas’s political writings which uses and transforms
through the other the shared language of French republicanism and Marxism. Several
political readers of Lévinas, discussed at length in the work, have criticized Lévinas’s
political thought as republican. One task of my book was to disclose the radical context
and implications of Lévinas’s reinterpretation of the French republican paradigm of
universal human rights and the mutuality of liberty, equality, and solidarity in citizenship.
This sense of liberalism from Locke to contemporary advocates of neoliberal
economics is a justification of capitalism. However, if liberalism is identified with political
liberalism of political rights as in recent American political thought, then this liberalism
demands not only restricting the power of the state but also the power of the market over
the public and the state. This last point is a key aspect of Adorno’s critique of the culture
industry that teaches and enforces heteronomy and Habermas’s still relevant 1962 work
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society that traces how private interests and structural features of capitalism
have undermined democracy and the critical capacities of the public. 2
Secondly, Angelova is right to identify the nation-state as the crux of the problem
and as a contested site structured by tensions between universalizing aspirations and
particular local bonds that constitute the flesh of social life of individuals. Adorno and
Lévinas are both suspicious of the totalizing character of the state while recognizing the
necessary role of the state in preserving individual rights and liberties. The latter moment
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prevented them from embracing the Leninist program and Soviet communism despite their
own varying Marxist tendencies. The notions of the freedom of the public and the
expansion and protection of individual rights had been a key facet of Marxism and social
democracy, as Rosa Luxemburg argued in her 1918 book that praises the socialist
aspirations while critiquing the anti-democratic practices of the Soviet Revolution
(Luxemburg 1961: 68–71).
Adorno and Lévinas both demanded rethinking philosophy after the Holocaust.
Lévinas’s concern for strangers, refugees, widows, and orphans does not only refer to
prophetic Judaism. It refers to the persons made stateless, driven away as refugees, and
then annihilated by the Nazi state. On this point, to a certain extent, Lévinas shares a
concern with Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism. Human rights make a
universal demand even as they cannot be universally or absolutely justified and are only
weakly enforced and made real through the legislation, institutions, and practices of nationstates and their tentative agreements. The naked appeal to human rights appears empty for
the persecuted and the refugee whose last appeal to humanity receives no response; except
perhaps by the dog Bobby who Lévinas describes in his narrative of the last Kantian in
Germany.
The critical comments about Arendt directed at my work in a previous review,
mentioned by Angelova, miss in my mind a crucial feature (namely, the aporia of human
rights) in Arendt’s analysis of the perplexity of the very right to have rights. 3 Angelova
describes this right as paradoxical and unenforced in the totalitarian state but not as
illusionary or delusional. It is inevitably conditioned by the realities of the nation state, as
a naked appeal to rights has no power by itself to stop the state bent on annihilation. Yet
the appeal is nonetheless made in the face of such destructive forces. They are bound to
nation-states while aspiring and appealing to a universality that places the all too often
brutal and inhumane policies and practices of nation-states in question. It points to the basis
of rights itself, the right to rights, which requires communities and states to enact and force
them if, as Lévinas writes, we are not to practice human sacrifice; or, as Adorno states, the
new categorical imperative is not to allow Auschwitz to happen again.
This paradox is still evident today in the plight of refugees trapped at the gates
and borders of the ostensibly free world are making a claim to a more radical solidarity that
is the very basis of right even if political parties and nation-states refuse to recognize them.
Minimally, at least, unrestricted solidarity for the sake of bare human rights can be a critical
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model to diagnosis political problems even if its normative application is refused. 4 More
exceptionally, it is a prophetic calling that Lévinas associates with the religious and leads
us to the essays of Curtis Hutt and Leah Kalmanson that each opens my materialistic and
the naturalistic interpretation to more expansive senses of the spiritual and the supernatural.
3. PARTICULARITY, UNIVERSALITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Curtis Hutt asks in his thoughtful and complex reflections whether we should pursue the
opposite strategy than the one proposed in my work. His points lead to an alternative
conclusion about the relation between religion, human rights, and our contemporary
situation. I will need to be somewhat brief to respond to these issues.
First, he begins by asking whether we can advocate for indigenous traditions that
ensoul different elements of nature to encompass rivers, mountains, and other natural
phenomena instead of embracing the material ethics of nature proposed in the work. After
all, in the contemporary world, to considerably modify Marx’s statement about commodity
fetishism, commodities and businesses appear ensouled while humans and the natural
world itself undergoes disenchantment and is described as if they were without life,
personality, and soul.
While I discuss Buddhism and Daoism at points in this work, and even more at
length elsewhere, the primary emphasis concerns how we suffer from a disconnection with
sensuous material environmental life itself. This connects with Marx’s analysis in his early
writings that played a key role not only in Adorno’s early notion of natural history but also
in Latin American progressive thought and in Enrique Dussel’s reading of Marx and
Lévinas. I agree that we can and should embrace and advocate more balanced indigenous
forms of life. At the same time, as Donna Haraway and Vandana Shiva have shown, there
is a need to contest the forms of material and social reproduction themselves of the
Capitalocene and the deepening environmental crisis-tendencies that we face regardless of
our willingness to recognize them or not. To this extent, critical intercultural discourses
need to be articulated that can negotiate between indigenous and traditional practices and
ways of life, insofar as they enter into conflict, progressive aspirations for equality, liberty,
and solidarity that are the prerequisites of intercultural democracy. An intercultural
approach to democracy and human rights requires balancing appeals to customary
traditions, local senses of identity, and universalizing aspirations toward a cosmopolitan
humanity that have a troubling Eurocentric and colonial history. Chapter Thirteen in
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particular traces how a critical interculturality can be achieved through the Levinasian
priority of the other.
One nexus of problems is cultural and intersubjective, in which shifts in our
attitudes toward nature and our “culture of nature” are necessary; another layer consists of
the structural dynamics that call for deeper socio-economic transformations to lessen the
effects of drastic environmental degradation and climate change. This structural dimension
intersects with the point concerning how much of the damaged life of individuals,
communities, and ecosystems remains invisible and unheard. It concerns the abject and
subaltern that remains mostly inapparent and disturbs existing society when its realities are
glimpsed in, for instance, violence at national borders.
The positionality of the abject and the subaltern can be thematized minimally in a
critical model that expresses, describes, and diagnoses this situation. An immanent critical
model, as conceived by Adorno, does not need to appeal to ideal ends or a realizable
normative prescription. It is both more minimalistic and more expansive than norms and
prescriptions that must negotiate the tensions between the ideal and the pragmatically
realizable. Thus, to mention two notable normative political philosophers, John Rawls and
Habermas introduce numerous conditions and restrictions for norms such as equality to
potentially be enacted. These conditions performatively weaken and contradict their very
aspiration to equality. Liberty, equality, and solidarity (the classic unrealized principles of
radical republicanism and Marxism) are deformed in nationalist and communist societies
according to Arendt and Lévinas, who indicate ways of reimagining the troubled
democratic paradigm. They can only begin with the recognition of their priority in the
other, in Lévinas; otherwise, they are limited by the self that reduces these to its own
positionality and power, as in classical possessive liberalism and contemporary
neoliberalism.
Adorno once wrote that “only exaggeration per se today can be the medium of
truth” (Adorno 2005: 99). Adorno and Lévinas deploy no doubt exaggeration and
hyperbole. They do so to encourage thinking and life in its sociality as resistance,
interruption, and reversal. It is in this context that asymmetry and non-identity can prove
more helpful than accounts of the self/other relation based on empathy and the primacy of
self-consciousness as expressed in Husserl, and pragmatic accounts of politics, as in John
Dewey’s problematic relativization of rights that is incompatible with the universalizing
aspirations described by Arendt and Lévinas. Rights not only potentially protect
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individuals from state coercion, as Hayek claimed in response to Dewey, they also limit
the coercion of economic interests as Habermas described in his work on the public sphere.
Habermas’s normative model of unrestricted communication provides a valuable critical
model to question and contest any given restrictions even when they appear pragmatically
justifiable according to a given social condition. However, Lévinas’s ethics offers an even
more radical vision of unrestricted solidarity. This language appears to be an overly
hyperbolic and exaggerated rhetoric to his critics. Yet, interpreted through Adorno’s notion
of a critical model, it encourages each denial of rights and humanity in the name of selfinterest, pragmatic usefulness, or mere indifference to be interrogated.
Arendt’s paradox of human rights and Lévinas’s ethics in the face of war concern
a similar problematic. Personal and political rights appear fragile in a world characterized
by power and without adequate justification in God, nature, or humanity; yet the claim
motivates not only the remnants of hope but the resistance in hopelessness of those facing
oppressive regimes and hopeless situations in which prophetic justice can still speak and
traces of the other-power of the good potentially appear in acts of resistance and responsive
solidarity.
4. OTHER-POWER AND OTHER-CONSTITUTION
IN INTERCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
“Without the aid of this Other-power, the human freedom of self-power
is closed off to us…. The realization of human freedom in self-power
becomes possible only through the assistance of Other-power.” (Tanabe
1990: 184)
I appreciate Leah Kalmanson’s insightful and nuanced remarks as she has
extensively worked on Lévinas and Buddhist and Japanese philosophy. Her present essay
concerns the intercultural dimensions of the book, which primarily are East Asian, and the
intercultural questions of otherness and “other power” (tariki 他力) that is drawn from Pure
Land Buddhism and the works of the Kyōto school philosopher Tanabe Hajime 田辺元
that deserve greater attention in Western discourses. Tanabe and Lévinas would be too
difficult to discuss here at length. In Tanabe’s work Philosophy as Metanoetics, however,
other-power not only expresses the great compassion (daihi 大悲) that characterizes the
other-orientation of the bodhisattva whose merit we rely on. As transcendence-inimmanence, it forms the deepest elements of the self and its very self-relation (Tanabe
1990).
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Very briefly put, East Asian Pure Land Buddhism developed from earlier Indian
meditative practices of keeping the Buddha in mind, visualizing the bodhisattva, and
repeating a mantra that connected one with a bodhisattva. It emphasizes devotion to and
reliance on Amitābha’s other-power. Its other-oriented ethics and notion of the other as
formative power makes it a significant intercultural source for engaging the ethics of the
other. The Japanese expression tariki means the force, power, or strength of another in
contrast to one’s own power (jiriki 自力). They signify two different routes to awakening
(becoming or relying on the bodhisattva) and, more broadly, forms of life-comportment.
Pure Land Buddhism stresses the role of compassion in contrast with Zen Buddhism’s
meditative illumination, which leads to different ethical sensibilities concerning the
concrete other. To simplify, the focus on the self in Zen is often considered more active
and individualistic, and the other in Pure Land Buddhism more passive and social. As
Tanabe demonstrates, Pure Land teaches significant philosophical lessons concerning
alterity and ethics. They also contrast the perfectionist uses toward which Buddhist
mindfulness and other practices have been directed in recent decades.
Although responsiveness and dependency might appear to be conservative and
reactive comportments leading to absorption in uncritical or subservient heteronomy, it is
revealing that they take on a radical potential in Adorno and Lévinas, as they do in
progressive forms of Buddhism in modern East Asia. Adorno and Lévinas both insist on
elements of relational heteronomy in the formation of the self and its sense of autonomy.
For instance, Adorno traces throughout his works the mimetic basis of ideology and
critique through his later writings. Forms of bodily and sensuous identification can function
as fixations; they can also operate as an openness and playfulness toward the object that
shapes and can be rediscovered in forms of art, communication, and rationality that resist
instrumentality and commodification.
Lévinas and Adorno often concentrate on the abject suffering other. Drawing on
and reversing Hegel and Marx, Adorno elucidates the moment of non-identity and the
priority of the object. Drawing on Jewish prophetic sources, Lévinas portrays the other as
ethical and prophetic source. The other does not only make an ethical demand upon me,
externally from the distance, but in a radical sense constitutes and invests my ethical
selfhood. In contrast to the constitution of the self that is advocated in Idealist and
transcendental philosophy, or its intersubjective reformulation in Habermas, the self
inevitably becomes itself through asymmetrical “other-constitution” and “other-power.”
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Other-power in this book concerned relations with material non-human and human others
through mimetic and experimental (in Adorno) and ethical and religious interaction (in
Lévinas). Lévinas, of course, refused to abandon the expression God in his ethics, even as
he refused other spiritual forces that he deemed idolatrous and pagan as Kalmanson
describes in her contribution.
In analogous ways to how rights and prophecy have sources in the other, in whom
we cannot radically differentiate the material, ethical, and the religious demand, the notion
of other-power cannot be separated from its Buddhist historical contexts in which it cannot
be reduced to a purely material condition in a reductive sense. In this non-reductive sense,
it can encompass spiritual or supernatural powers, particularly as they reflect ethical,
prophetic, and soteriological concerns. Even as my interpretive approach accentuates the
materialistic and the naturalistic dimensions of Adorno and Lévinas to engage the
environmental and economic reproduction of human life, I don’t think it needs to exclude
or limit different senses of the spiritual and the supernatural as operative through material
conditions (as in Buddhist ritual and ethical practices involving karma and merit) or
through the ethical demand and the good appearing in the finitude and imperfection of
interpersonal encounters and social relations.
5. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY OF THE OTHER AND
THE IMPERFECTIONISM OF THE GOOD
This leads us to a crucial point of my book. Democracy is currently facing a new
legitimation crisis as it is caught between the false universalism of neoliberal capitalism
and authoritarian chauvinistic and localist populist movements that deepen its crisistendencies. Orthodox liberal and Marxist analyses have failed to adequately address this
complexly mediated situation. One way of rethinking democracy to begin to confront this
situation is through a turn to an interculturally reimagined non-identity and alterity.
Democracy itself in my analysis requires embracing imperfection, non-identical
multiplicity, and reorientation toward alterity if it to survive the relentless compulsion
toward identity (trenchantly diagnosed by Adorno) and totality (Lévinas). While Lévinas
exaggerates the ethical demand, he simultaneously moderates it by critiquing moralistic
and other forms of perfectionism (a compulsion toward identity) that are interconnected
with ideologically deploying ideas of the good, the right, and the holy as instruments of
terror and justifications of ruling moral, political, and religious elites. Lévinas thus offers
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an answer to Adorno’s legitimate suspicions that ethics is primarily an ideological
compulsion toward identity as it, nevertheless, has a prophetic vocation and critical
potential.
Adorno is correct to conclude that ethics serves both critical-emancipatory and
ideological-disciplinary purposes and Levinas that the good is inevitably betrayed. The
demand for self and social perfection is a form of disciplinary control that forgets and
violates the good it would enforce. 5 Prophetic justice and unrestricted solidarity are
powerful ethical-political models that are undone in the fanaticism and perfectionism that
would totalize them and which consequently cannot recognize the imperfection of the good
amidst ordinary everyday life that calls forth in Lévinas (like Tanabe’s Pure Land
Buddhism) compassion, forgiveness, and mercy in daily interactions and in extraordinary
ituations where all contact, tenderness, and hope are denied and appear lost.
NOTES
1. “Critical models” are in Adorno exemplary constellations and thought-images of
immanent critique articulated from current dissonances, fractures, and resistances.
They are neither overly normative, and thus in danger of being detached from social
realities as an empty ought (the anti-naturalistic fallacy), nor uncritically absorbed in
current existing conditions (the naturalistic fallacy).
2. Habermas (1991). Habermas most recent work revisits the idea of the public sphere in
the context of the new social media, right-wing populism, and the systematic
distortions that undermine their communicative and democratic potential (Habermas
2022).
3. Arendt 1973: 290–302. Angelova is referring to Oltvai (2021). I agree with many of
his points, except his descriptions of Arendt’s paradox of rights (it misses the
universal aspiration that constitutes its paradoxicality), Levinas and Murdoch on the
immanent occurrence and imperfection of the transcendent good (the imperfection of
the good without which it is no longer good), and his problems with Judaic and ethical
prophecy as a religious category (I reconstruct it as ethical).On unrestricted or
unconditional solidarity, see the essays in Susemichel and Kastner (2021).
4. On unrestricted or unconditional solidarity, see the essays in Susemichel and Kastner
(2021).
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5. On the ideology of perfectionism and its disciplinary character and anti-democratic
elitism, compare King, Gerisch, and Rosa (2019).
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